Abstract-We investigate fundamental limits among identification, secrecy, template, and privacy-leakage rates in biometric identification system with secret binding from an information theoretic perspective. Ignatenko and Willems (2015) studied the system with estimation of individuals and clarified the fundamental limit among identification, secrecy, and privacy-leakage rates provided that the enrollment channel of the system is noiseless. In the enrollment process, however, it is highly considerable that noise occurs when bio-data is scanned. Recently, Günlü and Kramer (2018) analyzed the system assuming that the channel is noisy when there is only one individual. In this paper, we analyze the model considering the estimation of individuals under noisy enrollment and characterize the capacity region of identification, secrecy, template, and privacy-leakage rates in the biometric identification system with secret binding. The obtained result shows that it reduces to the one given by Ignatenko and Willems (2015) as a special case where the enrollment channel is noiseless.
I. INTRODUCTION
Biometric identification indicates the process of comparing biological characteristics or data (bio-data) of an individual to that individual's template already stored in a secure system database where several other individuals' information kept as well. Some well-known applications are fingerprint-based identification, iris-based identification, voice recognition, etc.
O'Sullivan and Schmid [13] and Willems et al. [16] separately introduced the discrete memoryless biometric identification system (BIS). Willems et al. [16] have clarified the identification capacity of the BIS, which is the maximum achievable rate of the number of individuals when the error probability converges to zero as the length of biometric data sequences goes to infinity. However, the implementation in [16] stores bio-data sequences in the system database in a plain form, leading to a critical privacy-leakage threat. Later, Tuncel [14] has developed their model by incorporating compression of bio-data sequences and clarified the capacity region of identification and coding rates (In this study, a codeword or helper data is called a template, and this coding rate is called the template rate).
Besides, there are several studies dealing with the secrecy rate of BIS. An example of them is the BIS model with secret binding. This is a model in which secret data of individual is chosen at random and the template is generated by individual's bio-data and secret data. In this scenario, we call the BIS model with secret binding the chosen secret BIS (CS-BIS) model. In the CS-BIS model, the given secret data or secret key is chosen independently of bio-data. Ignatenko and Willems [7] and Lai et al. [11] investigated the fundamental trade-off between secret data and privacy-leakage rates in the CS-BIS model. Ignatenko and Willems [9] continued working on the model and characterized the capacity region of identification, secrecy, and privacy-leakage rates in the CS-BIS. One thing to be noted is that the three studies mentioned above assumed the enrollment channel to be noiseless. However, when bio-data is scanned, it is highly considerable that bio-data sequences are subject to noise so it is important to consider the enrollment channel is noisy like in [6] , [14] , [16] , and [18] . Related to the studies on the CS-BIS model, a generated secret BIS (GS-BIS) model, where secret data is extracted from bio-data, is studied in [6] - [11] , [17] , and [18] .
Studies on the CS-BIS model without estimation of individuals and incorporating the analysis of the template rate as well as the secrecy and privacy-leakage rates can be found in [6] and [12] . Koide and Yamamoto [12] analyzed the model for non-negligible secrecy-leakage. Günlü and Kramer [6] evaluated the model by treating the enrollment channel is noisy and the benefit of having single individual made a successful breakthrough for them to characterize the capacity region by one auxiliary random variable (RV) in an elegant way. When the model is extended to the one by considering individual's estimation, it is difficult to use the same analyzing techniques, especially the evaluating of privacy-leakage rate, to characterize the capacity region. In the GS-BIS scenario, Yachongka and Yagi [18] have characterized the capacity region with two auxiliary RVs recently. Then, an interesting question is if the same argument also works for the CS-BIS scenario.
In this paper, we are interested in deriving the capacity region of identification, secrecy, template, and privacy-leakage rates of the CS-BIS model. Compared to the model proposed in [9] , we analyze the region under conditions that 1) there is a noisy channel in the enrollment phase, 2) we consider a scheme of both compressing template (as in [6] and [14] ) and protecting privacy (as in [9] and [11] ), 3) we analyze the capacity region provided that the prior distribution of an identified individual is unknown. To handle the bottleneck of evaluating privacy-leakage in the achievability proof, we introduce an auxiliary RV corresponding to a template of individual. The obtained characterization of the region is basically different from the ones derived in [6] and [9] . As a special case, it can be checked that our result reduces to the one in [9, Theorem 2] where the enrollment channel is noiseless.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we define notation used in this paper and describe the details of the system model.
A. Notation
Calligraphic A stands for a finite alphabet. Upper-case A denotes a RV taking values in A and lower-case a ∈ A denotes its realization. P A (a) := Pr[A = a], a ∈ A, represents the probability distribution on A, and P A n represents the probability distribution of RV
n , the nth Cartesian product of A. P A n B n represents the joint probability distribution of a pair of RVs (A n , B n ) and its conditional probability distribution P A n |B n is defined as P A n |B n (a n |b n ) =
Throughout this paper, logarithms are of base two. Integers m and n such that m < n, [m, n] denotes the set {m, m + 1, · · · , n}. A partial sequence of a sequence c n from the first symbol to the tth symbol (c 1 , · · · , c t ) is represented by c t . We define the strong typicality property as below. A sequence x n ∈ X n is said to be δ-strongly typical with respect to a distribution p X on X if | 1 n N (a|x n ) − P X (a)| ≤ δ and P X (a) = 0 implies 1 n N (a|x n ) = 0 for all a ∈ X , where N (a|x n ) is the number of occurrences of a in the sequence x n , and δ is an arbitrary positive number. The set of sequences x n ∈ X n such that x n is δ-strongly typical is called the strongly typical set and is denoted by A (n) (X), which is the same notation in [3] . This concept is easily extended to joint distributions.
B. Model Descriptions
The CS-BIS model considered in this paper is shown in Fig.  1 . Basically, it consists of two phases: (I) Enrollment Phase and (II) Identification Phase. Next we explain the details of each phase. (I) Enrollment Phase:
Let I = {1, 2, · · · M I } and X be the set of indexes of individuals and a finite source alphabet, respectively. For any i ∈ I, we assume that
n , an n-length bio-data sequence of individual i, is generated i.i.d. from a stationary memoryless source P X . The generating probability for each sequence
Now let J = {1, 2, · · · M J } and S = {1, 2, · · · M S } be the set of indexes of templates stored in the database and individuals' secret data, respectively. All bio-data sequences are observed via a discrete memoryless channel (DMC) {Y, P Y |X , X }, where Y is a finite output-alphabet of P Y |X . The corresponding probability that x n i ∈ X n is observed as y
for all i ∈ I. A secret data s(i) ∈ S is chosen uniformly at random and independent of all other RVs. Encoder mapping f encodes y Bio-data sequence x n w (w ∈ I) of an unknown w (index of individual w having enrolled in the database) is observed via a DMC {Z, P Z|X , X }, where Z is a finite output-alphabet of P Z|X . The probability that x n w ∈ X n is output as
The sequence z n is passed to the decoder Z n × J M I −→ I×S, comparing z n with templates in the database and outputs the pair of estimated value ( w, s(w)).
n for an arbitrary i ∈ I. In this paper, we assume neither that the identified individual index W are uniformly distributed over I nor that there is a prior distribution of W .
The motivation of analyzing the BIS provided that the distribution of W is unknown is that the frequencies of coming to use the system for each individual are likely different. For example, it is hard to think that each customer uses service of a bank teller at the same rate. Therefore, to get closer to real application, this assumption is important to take care of. 
III. DEFINITIONS AND MAIN RESULTS
The formal definition of the addressed problem and the main theorem of this study are given below. Definition 1. A tuple of an identification, secrecy, template, privacy-leakage rates (R I , R S , R J , R L ) is said to be achievable if for any δ > 0 and large enough n there exist pairs of encoders and decoders that satisfy for all i ∈ I
Moreover, the capacity region R is defined as the closure of the set of all achievable rate tuples.
In Definition 1, (4) is the condition of identification error probability (IEP) of individual i which should be arbitrarily small. Equations (5), (6) and (7) are the constraints related to identification, template and secrecy rates, respectively. In terms of the privacy protection perspective, we measure the information leakage of individual i by (8) and (9) . Condition (8) measures the amount of privacy-leakage of original biodata X n i from template J(i) in the database and it must be smaller than or equal to R L + δ. Condition (9) measures the secrecy-leakage between the template and the secret data of individual i and it requires that the leaked amount is arbitrarily small.
Theorem 1. The capacity region for the CS-BIS model is given by
where RVs X, Y , Z, U , and V form a Markov chain
, a}, and V and U take values in some finite alphabets U and V with |U| ≤ (|Y| + 2)(|Y| + 1) and |V| ≤ |Y| + 2.
Likewise the observation in [6] , the capacity region of Theorem 1 is clearly smaller than the capacity region of the GS-BIS model characterized in [18] , where R J is bounded by I(Y ; V ). The ranges of identification, secrecy, and privacyleakage rates do not change but the range of template rate does. A remark given in [17] indicated that in case the enrollment channel is noiseless (X = Y ), the fundamental limit of R L and R J is identical for the GS-BIS model. However, the result of this study implies that this remark does not hold for the CS-BIS model.
As a special case, it is easy to check that Theorem 1 reduces to the region derived in [9, Theorem 2], which was characterized by a single auxiliary RV, when X = Y and the template rate R J is allowed to be arbitrary large. On the other hand, the characterization in Theorem 1 requires two auxiliary RVs. The difference between R I is zero (as in [6] ) and positive (as in [18] and this study) also appears in the analysis of R L . At this point, we have not yet found any method to establish Theorem 1 by using only one auxiliary RV.
A numerical result of the rate region given by the righthand side of Eq. (10) where R S = 0 is shown in Fig. 2 . This is a three-dimensional figure of R I (z-axis) as a function of R J (x-axis) and R L (y-axis) and the figure was plotted under the following settings. Alphabets X , Y, and Z is assumed to be binary. We fix source probability P X (0) = 0.5 and Fig. 4 . CS-BIS encoder transition probability of channels P Y |X (0|0) = P Y |X (1|1) = P Z|X (0|0) = P Z|X (1|1) = 0.9 and we also restrict the size of U and V to 2, which does not lose the general behaviors of the rate region. The achievable rate region of the rate tuple (R I , R J , R L ) is the region below the curved surface of Fig. 2 in the direction of blue arrow and this is a convex region. Fig.  3 is a projection of the rate region (Fig. 2) onto the R J R I plain and the area shaded purple represents the achievable area. Apparently, the area behaves in the same manner as the calculated graph shown in [14] .
The proof idea of this part is similar to the achievability proof of the GS-BIS model provided in [18] . The difference is we use the encoder and decoder of the GS-BIS as components inside the encoder and decoder of the CS-BIS. In order to avoid the confusion in the following arguments, we introduce some new notations which are used only in this part. J C (i) and S C (i) denote the template J(i) and the chosen secret data S(i) of individual i for the CS-BIS encoder. Also, J G (i) and S G (i) denote the template and secret data of individual i generated by the GS-BIS encoder. Moreover, M J C and M J G denote the number of templates of the CS-BIS and of the GS-BIS 1 . More specifically, we deploy a so-called masking layer as shown in Fig. 4 to mask the secret data S C (i) ∈ S for the CS-BIS by using S G (i) ∈ S. The template J C (i) is the combined information of J G (i) and the masked data S C (i) ⊕ S G (i), i.e.,
At the decoder in the CS-BIS, the decoder of the GS-BIS first estimates S G (i) and output the estimate as S G (i), and thus the chosen secret data can be retrieved by
where ⊕ and denote addition and subtraction modulo M S . This technique is also used in [1] , [6] , [7] , and [9] .
First, we fix δ > 0 and a block length n. We choose test channels P U |Y and P V |U . We set
and R L = I(X; V )+2δ. We also set the number of individuals M I = 2 nR I , the number of secret data M S = 2 nR S , and the number of templates for CS-BIS encoder M J C = 2 nR J , including the number of templates for GS-BIS encoder
n(I(Y ;V )+2δ) , respectively. 
Random Code Generation

Encoding (Enrollment):
When the GS-BIS encoder, which is used as a component in the CS-BIS encoder, observes the bio-data sequence y n i ∈ Y n , it determines the pair of j G (i) and s G (i). The encoder looks for m and k satisfying (y
In case there do not exist such m and k or there are multiple pairs of such m and k, we set j G (i) =j(1) and s G (i) =s (1, 1). Then, the CS-BIS encoder uses the secret data s G (i) generated by the component to conceal the chosen secret
is stored at position i in the database.
Decoding (Identification):
When the GS-BIS decoder, used as a component in the CS-BIS decoder, observes z n ∈ Z n (the noisy version of x , 1)). Finally, the CS-BIS decoder outputs w as the index of template which is previously determined by the component and
as the result of subtraction modulo M S between the masked information and the estimated s G (w). We set ( w, s(w)) = g(z n , j(1), · · · , j(M I )). Next we shall check the conditions of (4)- (9) in Definition 1 averaged over randomly chosen codebook C n .
Intermediate Steps:
Before advancing further, we provide important lemmas that play important roles in the rest of the evaluations.
Lemma 1. (Willems and Ignatenko [15])
It holds that
where δ n denotes some positive value satisfying δ n ↓ 0 as n → ∞.
(Proof) The proof is provided in [15, Proof of Theorem 1], so we omit it in this paper. 
(Proof) The proof can be found in [10, Appendix C].
Analysis of Error Probability:
The operation at the decoder (12) means that
The detailed proof is available in Appendix A-A.
Therefore, it is obvious that the IEP of individual i for the CS-BIS model can also be bounded by
for large enough n.
Analysis of Template and Secrecy Rates:
it is easy to confirm that (6) holds from the parameter settings. Similarly, it is obvious that (7) holds.
Analysis of Secrecy-Leakage:
We invoke the following relation on secrecy-leakage between the CS-BIS model and the GS-BIS model [9, Appendix B-A]:
It is showed that the secrecy-leakage of the GS-BIS model can be bounded by
for large enough n. The detail proof can be seen in Appendix A-B.
From (16), it is clear that the secrecy-leakage of the CS-BIS model can also be bounded by
as well for large enough n.
Analysis of Privacy-Leakage Rate:
It is shown in [9, Appendix B-A] that
It is showed that the privacy-leakage of the GS-BIS model can be bounded by
for large enough n. The detail proof is available in Appendix A-C. Then, the privacy-leakage of the CS-BIS Model can be made that
where A (n) (XY V ) denotes the set of -strongly typical sequences.
Finally, applying the selection lemma [2, Lemma 2.2] to above results , we can conclude that there exists at least a codebook satisfying all conditions in Definition 1 for large enough n.
B. Converse Part
For the converse proof, we consider a more relaxed case where identified individual index W is uniformly distributed over I and (4) is replaced with the average error criterion
We shall show that the capacity region, which is not smaller than the original one, is contained in the right-hand side of (10) . We assume that a rate tuple (R I , R S , R J , R L ) is achievable so that there exists a pair of encoder and decoder (f, g) such that all conditions in Definition 1 with replacing (4) by (20) are satisfied for any δ > 0 and large enough n.
During the process of the proof, we employ Fano's inequality [8] , [9] and [15] which states that
Here, we provide other key lemmas used in this part.
Lemma 3. (Ignatenko and Willems [9])
The joint entropy of W and S(W ) is bounded by
(Proof) The proof is given in [9, Proof of Theorem 1]. For t ∈ [1, n], we define auxiliary RVs U t and V t as U t = (Z t−1 , J(W ), S(W )) and V t = (Z t−1 , J(W )), respectively. We denote a sequence of RVs
Lemma 4. (Ignatenko and Willems [7])
The following Markov chains hold: 
(Proof)
The proof of Lemma 5 is provided in Appendix B-A.
We fix RVs U and V specified in Lemma 5 for subsequent arguments.
Analysis of Identification and Secrecy Rates:
It can be shown that 
The proof is shown in Appendix B-B.
Analysis of Template Rate:
We use similar arguments provided in [6] to prove the range of R J . From (6) , it holds that
where (a) because J(W ) is a function of (Y 
Analysis of Privacy-Leakage Rate:
It can be proved that
The proof is provided in Appendix B-C.
By letting n → ∞ and δ ↓ 0, we obtain that the capacity region is contained in the right-hand side of (10) from (26)-(29).
To prove the bound on the cardinalities of the sets of U and V, we use the the support lemma in [5, Lemma 15.4 ] to show that |V| should have |Y| − 1 elements to preserve P V |U and three more elements I(Z; U ), I(Y ; V ) and I(X; V ). It means |V| ≤ |Y| + 2. Similarly, it can be proved that the size of set |U| should have at most (|Y| + 2)(|Y| + 1) by the argument in [4, Appendix] .
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this study, we characterized the fundamental trade-off among identification, secrecy, template, and privacy-leakage rates in the CS-BIS model. We modified the system model proposed in [9] by introducing noisy enrollment as in [6] and deriving the capacity region provided that the prior distribution of identified individual is unknown It appears that the characterization of the capacity region for the CS-BIS model also requires two auxiliary RVs like the region obtained in [18] . This is basically different from the result of the original work in [6] - [11] and [14] . As special cases, this result reduces to the region given in [9, Theorem 1] when the enrollment channel is noiseless. For future work, we analyze the capacity region of both CS-BIS and GS-BIS models under strong secrecy criterion regarding secrecyleakage. 
and those at the decoder are:
Then, the IEP of individual i can be evaluated as Pr{( W , S(W )) = (W, S(W ))|W = i} = Pr
Pr{E l }.
Indeed, Pr{E 1 } and Pr{E 2 } can be made smaller than δ for large enough n by the standard technique of typical sets [3] . For Pr{E 3 }, it is sufficient to evaluate probabilities of the following two events E 3 : for some i = i such that (Z n , V n i ) ∈ A (n) (ZV ), E 3 : for some i = i such that (Z n , U n i ) ∈ A (n) (ZU ).
Recall that we set 
for large enough n, where (a) and (b) follow from the properties of the strongly typical set [3] and the last inequalities of (32) and (33) follow because the Markov chain in (10) is applied. Therefore, the IEP of individual i can be made that
